

Archives in Russia on the Famine in Ukraine

Iryna Matiash

The problem of the Holodomor in Ukraine is among the most complicated both in Ukrainian and in foreign historiography. Active research into the Great Famine in large measure spans only the post-Soviet period, since, as we know, the question “did not exist” in Soviet historiography. In studying such an important (and for the Ukrainian people painful) problem, historical sources possess a special significance and their unprejudiced analysis and interpretation is the duty of every historian. The initiation of the process leading to the declassification of archival information, which took place at different times in the various successor states of the Soviet empire, made it possible for a documentary substratum to be created for an objective study of the tragic pages of our history. Now there is no reason to complain that the necessary source materials are unavailable.

True, here one might mention the loss of some archival fonds or aggregates of documents, and the limiting of access to individual archives, fonds, or documents.

Generally, however, the documentary publications and collections of oral history, which have been appearing for more than 15 years now in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, provide a graphic representation of the political, economic, national, and social components of the Holodomor-Genocide in Ukraine. Nevertheless, difficulties arise with the interpretation of historical sources, particularly in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian scholarly discussion of this issue with its obvious political subtext. The archival information now available, as well as that which has yet to come to light, demands competent evaluation. The researcher who aspires to reveal the truth should turn to the primary sources, to archival information, at the same time bearing in mind that, for the most part, the most striking documents have already been published.

Archival documentation containing information on the Holodomor is held in the state archives of Ukraine,¹ as well as the archives of governmental entities in states that were directly related to its organization, or

which provided relief to starving Ukrainians, or those which became a second homeland to post-World War II Ukrainian emigrants. Perhaps the largest number of documents in terms of volume is to be found in the federal and local archives of the Russian Federation, which hold documents of all-Union state and Party organs, as well as their leading figures, that is, those who bore personal responsibility for the Ukrainian tragedy.

A large number of the documents accessible to researchers are already in scholarly circulation; Ukrainian and foreign scholars are actively using the information they provide in their specialized works. A large aggregate of documents has been made available in some fundamental publications.² Concise data on the informational resources of the Russian Federation’s archives regarding Holodomor issues have been supplied by V. Marochko³ and H. Kapustian,⁴ while D. Khubova⁵ has consulted the Holodomor’s oral history.

All the same, it remains imperative that a detailed examination be conducted of the information bearing on the Holodomor in Ukraine that has accumulated in

2. *Dokumenty svidel'stvuiut. Iz istorii derevni nakanune i v khode kollektivizatsii 1927-1932 gg.*, ed V. P. Danilov and N. A. Ivanitskii (Moscow: Izd. Polit. literatury, 1989), 526 pp.; *Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 1930 gg. Sbornik dokumentov*, compiled by O. V. Khlevniuk et al. (Moscow, 1995), 340 pp.; *Tragediia sovetskoï derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. 1927-1939. Dokumenty i materialy. V 5-ti tt. Tom 1: Mai 1927—noiabr' 1929*, edited by V. Danilov et al. (Moscow, 1999), 880 pp. Tom 3: *Konets 1930-1933* (Moscow, 2001); *Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936*, compiled by O. V. Khlevniuk et al. (Moscow, 2001), 798 pp.; V. Vasylyev and Iu. Shapoval, eds., *Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poïzdka V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukraïnu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933* (Kyiv: Henezza, 2001); *Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov partiinoi i gosudarstvennoï vlasti. Ianvar' 1922-dekabr' 1936 g.*, edited by A. N. Iakovlev, compiled by V. N. Khaustov et al. (Moscow: MFD, 2003), 912 pp.

3. V. I. Marochko, “Rosii's'ki arkhivni dzhherela ta zbirnyky dokumentiv pro prychny ta obstavyny holodomoru.” In *Holod 1932-33 v Ukraïni: Prychny ta naslidky*, ed. V. M. Lytvyn (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2003), 41-50.

4. Halyna Kapustian, “Holodomor 1932-33 r.r. v Ukraïni za materialamy moskovs'kykh arkhiviv.” In *Try holodomory v Ukraïni v XX st.: Pohliad iz s'ohodennia. Materialy Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsii* (Kyiv: Ukraïns'ka vydavnycha spilka, 2003), 87-109.

5. D. N. Khubova, “Chernye doski: tabula rasa golod 1932-33 godov v ustnykh svidel'stvakh,” in *Golod 1932-1933 godov. Sbornik statei*, edited by Iu. N. Afanas'ev (Moscow: RGGU, 1995), 67-88.

1. See: R. Ia. Pyrih, “Dokumenty z istorii holodu u fondakh arkhivoskhovyshch Ukraïny,” *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 5 (2003): 82-101.

Russian institutions of memory (archives, museums, libraries), while a thematic analysis of such historical sources might well become a separate project. The present survey was carried out as an attempt to distinguish the aggregate of documented history bearing on the “organization” of the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-33 within the context of a broader theme, namely, “Archival Ukrainica in the Russian Federation.”

The documents bearing information that directly or indirectly reflects different aspects of the problem are concentrated in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Russian State Archive of the Economy, the Russian State Military Archive, the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia, as well as the governmental archives of the Bryansk, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk oblasts, the Krasnodar and Primorsky krais, the Center for Documentation of the Recent History of the Krasnodar krai, and the Kursk and Voronezh oblast State Archives of Socio-Political History.

The nature, form, and contents of these documents were determined by the function they were intended to perform, as well as by the authority and duties of the bodies whose activities generated them. Direct evidence regarding the organization of a “man-made” famine among the peasantry is to be found in documents of an official provenance: legislative and other normative acts; minutes of meetings and decisions of the Politburo CC CPSU (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and Party organs of various levels; stenographic reports of congresses, plenums, consultations, devoted to questions bearing on all aspects of the grain-delivery campaigns of 1931–33; diplomatic documents reflecting the international context of the problem; documents resulting from actions of the government’s executive organs; special bulletins; circulars; informational summaries; records of interrogations; official correspondence; documents of personal origin; auto-communicative documents (diaries, memoirs); personal letters; and oral history.

Documentation that reflects the problem or its individual aspects indirectly might include the statistics which record the dynamics of mortality rates; documents from bodies which organized and effected the export of grain; documents generated by activities of transport firms involved in grain export; documents that reflect the deportation and re-settlement of peasants from Ukraine and the Kuban; etc. The majority of documents is classified “Confidential” or “Secret.”

A more detailed examination of documents dealing with the Holodomor-Genocide to be found in the basic Russian state archives follows.

The Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History

This archive was formed out of the previous Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU and, in consequence, inherited holdings that are especially valuable for study of the Holodomor in Ukraine. Here have also been deposited part of the fonds from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. Of the 689 fonds in the archive, of particular interest are the CC CPSU fond (f. 17), and the personal fonds of Joseph Stalin (f. 558), Lazar Kaganovich (f. 81), and Viacheslav Molotov (f. 82).

The CC CPSU fond holds documents of the collective CC organs: the Plenums, Politburo, Orgburo, the CC Secretariat and *apparat*. Here are minutes of meetings, stenographic reports, decisions of the CC VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], also official correspondence regarding organization of grain delivery. The Ukrainian aspect is clearly reflected, particularly in the following decisions of the CC VKP(b) and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the USSR:

(a) On grain delivery in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and in the Western oblast dated December 14, 1932. This authorized the deportation of peasants to the North (and also the Communists who failed to squeeze grain out of them). It forbade Ukrainianization in the Kuban and called, as something not to be delayed, for the Ukrainian language in official dealings and the mass media to be replaced by Russian, that being the language “more understood by the Kuban population.”

(b) On Ukrainianization in the Far Eastern krai, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Central Chernozem oblast, and other regions of the USSR, dated December 15, 1932, intended by autumn, 1933, to convert the press and educational institutions to the Russian language, thus forbidding their native tongue to Ukrainians re-settled in these regions.

(c) On grain delivery in Ukraine, dated December 19, 1932. This decision pointed to the “unserious attitude” of the Ukrainian leaders to the grain-delivery campaign, and sent Kaganovich and Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine.

These official documents are currently in scholarly circulation both in works of historical research and in published collections: *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* (The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: through the eyes of historians, and the language of documents, Kyiv 1990); *Komandyry velykoho holodu* (Commanders of the Great Famine, Kyiv 2001), and others. In this fond are also deposited copies of similar decisions of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukr SSR and the CC CP(b)Ukraine. An example is the bitterly familiar decision, dated

December 6, 1932, “On entering on the black board [blacklist] those villages that maliciously sabotage grain delivery” (op. 26, spr. 550). In this group of documents might also be included the decision of the Dnipropetrovsk *obkom* CP(b)Ukraine, “On undertakings in the struggle against famine,” dated February 10, 1933, where, in addition, there are facts on death by starvation even of collective farmers who had a large number of *trudodni* [workdays] to their credit.

Materials related to plenums and decisions of the CC VKP(b) testify to the role of the Party leadership in the organization of the Famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry. The People’s Commissariat of Trade was directed on August 30, 1930, to draw up and submit to the Politburo plans for fulfilling obligations related to the export of grain, and providing specific responsibilities for the “grain-producing regions (Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasus and others).”⁶ Personal responsibility for grain shipment to the ports was placed on the Secretary of the CC CP(b)U, Stanislav Kosior.

The decision of May 10, 1931, “On the Grain Balance,” obligated Party committee secretaries to begin shipping grain from the “interior *raions*” and, within ten days, to send out of Ukraine 25,000 tons of grain to Moscow and 9,000 tons to the Crimea; and, within twenty days, 5,000 tons of flour to the Transcaucasus.⁷ A check by “sampling” of available grain reserves in the storage facilities of *Souzhklib* and of cooperatives was entrusted to the OGPU.⁸

According to a decision regarding special settlers,” dated July 10, 1931, deportees were to be placed in the former Kherson okruha (in Kakhovka raion—400 families; in Khorly—800, in Skadovsk—400; Hola Prystan’—300; Henichesk—350). In the Novovasylivka, Novotroitske, and the Akymovsk raions of the former Melitopol okruha, it was planned to settle 250 families in each.⁹

The familiar decision of October 30, 1932, “On steps for the intensification of grain deliveries,” obligated obkoms to institute a daily review and operational control over the fulfillment of grain-delivery plans and to submit reports every five days to the CC CP(b)U. Further, to “assist” the obkoms, it dispatched prominent Party figures into the field accompanied by not less than 100 leading workers from the central organs. The grain-delivery plan for November was set at 90,000,000 poods.¹⁰

Information on which a general picture might be based is provided by the Plenum of the CC of the

Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, which took place October 30-31, 1931. The noose on the Ukrainian peasantry’s neck was being tightened by the hand of S. Kosior. He called the grain-delivery plan for Ukraine of 510,000,000 poods (greater than that for other republics) “unreservedly realistic and possible to fulfill, without any particular sacrifice on the part of the collective peasantry and the Ukrainian village generally.”¹¹ For comparison, the plan for Belarus called for 10,500,000 poods; for the northern Caucasus, 200,000,000; for Kazakhstan, 55,000,000, etc.

The archival fond of Kaganovich, the “200 percent” Stalinist, contains documents (431 items) that characterize all aspects of his activity from 1918 to 1957. He had been secretary of the CC All-UnionCP(b) and from December 15 oversaw the agricultural department of the CC. The nature of the documents in his personal fond is quite varied. These are biographical documents, drafts, theses, stenographic records of reports and speeches at congresses of the RCP(b)-All-UnionCP(b)-CPSU at plenums of the CC and the CCC, consultations and other meetings, drafts of resolutions of Party forums, summaries of Party purge results, preparatory materials and manuscripts of newspaper articles, appointment books, correspondence with central and local Party organizations and leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government, letters and notations with resolutions and comments by Stalin. In the context of the problem being studied, of particular interest is Kaganovich’s correspondence with Stalin and Molotov; documents on his trip to the Donbas in April, 1933; documents about the creation of political sections in the MTS, decisions and directives on agriculture (1930-1932), brief diary entries and stenographic records of his speeches during trips to Ukraine (1932-1934).

One of his diaries (f. 81, op. 3, d. 215, l. 1-24) records the progress of his trip to Ukraine on April 22-29, 1932). This senior Soviet office-holder found that in Kyiv a counter-revolutionary organization involving lecturers and students had been rendered harmless; “wreckers” had been unmasked at the Ukrainian Tractor Center; insurgent groups of Polish descent identified. These facts testify to the existence of systemic repression. The diary mentions a new form for influencing the peasants: “insistent discussion” of OGPU workers with the head of a collective farm and members of the farm’s executive. Some idea of the forms this discussion took might be gleaned from unofficial correspondence and oral accounts. The summary included this directive: grain, including the seed, must be delivered without any delay; 700 families must be expelled from Dnipropetrovsk oblast; 1,000 homesteads in Kharkiv oblast to be deprived of property, homes, land; 500 in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

6. RGASPI, f. 17, op., 162, d. 9, l. 21-22.

7. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1935, l. 7-9.

8. *Ibid.*, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 35.

9. *Ibid.*, op. 162, d. 10, l. 116-18.

10. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 26, d. 54, l. 192-97.

11. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 43-44.

Another “Ukrainian” diary, this one covering April 10-20, 1933, (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216) is an account of Kaganovich’s trip to the Don region. Collective farmers’ “unsatisfactory work” was the reason for failure to fulfill the grain-delivery plan. Horses dropped dead of disease because of “poor management, bad care.” The possibility for improvement lay in the intensification of Party control. “The political section must have an agent, an informer in every collective farm, in every field and in every brigade” (f. 81, op. 3, d. 181-193). Behind every comment in the diary stand dozens and hundreds of mutilated lives.

Kaganovich’s diaries of his trips to the North Caucasus on November 1–8, 1932; January 30–February 5, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 215); June 20-24, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216); and July 20-24, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216) testify to the cynicism of those who organized the famine and the consistency with which they implemented their plans. They emphasize the “great resistance to the grain deliveries” in Krasnodar krai, and clearly state the primary political goal—to break that resistance, beginning with *raikom* secretaries and ending with rank-and-file collective farmers.

In terms of its bearing on the problem examined here, no less an important component of the Kaganovich archive is his correspondence with Stalin during 1931-1936, in which he was the main addressee. The body of this correspondence containing Stalin’s mostly terse directions and Kaganovich’s brief communications, lengthy commentary and detailed reports was published in 2001 by the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History as part of the Yale University “Annals of Communism” project.¹² Individual letters have appeared in other publications, in particular, *Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poїzdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukraїnu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933* (Commanders of the Great Famine: Travels of L. Kaganovich and V. Molotov to Ukraine and the North Caucasus, 1932-1933, Kyiv 2001); “Tragediia sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. 1927-1939: Dokumenty i materialy. V 5-ti tt./T. 3” (The Tragedy of the Soviet Village. Collectivization and Dekulakization. 1927-1939. 5 Volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow 2002).

In the personal fond of Viacheslav Molotov (Skriabin) there are 1,712 items for 1907-1986. In the autumn of 1932 Molotov headed the Ukrainian Special Commission, created by Stalin’s directive to intensify activities related to grain delivery. In his fond are to be found texts of his reports and speeches during his travels in Ukraine (1928, 1932-1933), particularly on deliveries in the USSR and Ukraine (December, 1931-January 1931; October-November, 1932). There is

12. *Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska, 1931-1936*, compiled by O. V. Khlevniuk, et al. (Moscow, 2001).

correspondence with Stalin and other Soviet leaders, CC CP(b)U materials on deliveries, statistical data about the situation in Ukraine,¹³ letters to Stalin from V. Chubar, Head of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, and from H. Petrovs’kyi, Head of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, about famine in Ukraine.

The dimensions of the Ukrainian tragedy are particularly evident from a report submitted to Molotov by M. Chernov, Deputy Head of the Committee on Deliveries, Council on Labor and Defense, which dealt with the extent to which Ukraine was supplied with foodstuffs. Chernov states: “The overall need in Ukraine for grain for the second quarter, according to the supply plan, is 410,000 tons in grain measure, or 136,000 tons monthly. On April 1, Ukraine had 80,000 tons of commercial resources and in April 55,000 tons were released from the NEP fond.”¹⁴ Even making allowance for the fact that numbers given in Party documents were often inaccurate, the extent to which the survival of Ukrainians was in peril is obvious.

The letters to Stalin from Vlas Chubar and Heorhii Petrovs’kyi, both dated June 10, 1932, are generally already known. Despite the taboo surrounding the word “hunger,” they both contain information that left no reason to doubt the tragic nature of the situation in Ukraine.

As a result of visits to thirteen raions in Kyiv oblast and four in Vinnytsia oblast, Chubar, obviously downplaying the proportions of the tragedy, informed Stalin that: “from March-April those who did not have enough to eat, who starved, swelled, and died of hunger could, in every village, be counted in the tens and hundreds” (f. 82, op. 2, d. 139). Petrovs’kyi was more circumspect in his account. “I was in many villages in these raions and everywhere saw that a notable part of the village is seized by hunger. *Not many*, but there are also those swollen from hunger, usually the poorest, but [including] even the middle peasants. They use such substitutes [for food] that couldn’t be worse, and even those substitutes are sometimes not there” (f. 82, op. 2, d. 139). Petrovs’kyi predicted that “the famine will intensify” and so asked for assistance in the form of buckwheat for sowing.

The results of such appeals have been analyzed more than once by researchers of the Famine in Ukraine. This information is closely tied to accounts provided by f. 17,¹⁵ already placed into circulation by Ukrainian scholars, about how on June 26 Chubar personally traveled to

13. See Larysa Malashenko, “Dokumenty osobovykh fondiv L. Kahanovycha ta V. Molotova iak dzherela vvychnennia istorii Ukraїny v XX stolitti” in *Komandyry velykoho holodu*, 194-98.

14. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 13, l. 133.

15. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 4.

Moscow to convince Molotov and Kaganovich to release 15,000 tons of rye and rice flour for Ukraine from state stores.¹⁶

Indirect information about the battle of the Soviet leadership with the Ukrainian peasantry is given in statistical data from July 4-5, 1932, on the amount of ploughed land in collective farms; issue of grain to sovkhozes and kolkhozes for seeding and consumption in 1932; on the yield of grain and technical crops in the Ukr SSR for 1928–1931; on agricultural productivity in the USSR and the Ukr SSR; on the gross harvest of grain in the Ukr SSR in 1927-1932; about grain deliveries in the USSR and the Ukr SSR in 1927-1932; about fulfillment of the grain delivery plan in the USSR by regions in 1931-1932. These have been gathered in spr. 139 of f. 82 (op. 2).¹⁷ They would, of course, need to be examined critically and collated with other sources.

The list of starving raions in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Vinnytsia, and Kharkiv oblasts (f. 82) with the notation that none of these oblasts has fulfilled the grain-delivery plan has already appeared in print a number of times. The value of these documents is not so much in the information about the spread of famine (this is no longer new for the scholarly community) as it is in their peripheral aspect which testifies to the cynicism of those who organized the Holodomor.

Quite informative are the telegrams of October 29 and 30, 1932, from Molotov to Stalin, on lowering the grain-delivery plan for Ukraine. As a result of an examination of this matter at a meeting of the CC CP(b)U Politburo in which obkom secretaries participated, the plan was reduced by 70,000,000 poods. Instead, Molotov proposed “directing 50-70 comrades with Party experience, along the lines of gubkom and okrugkom secretaries, for one month to work on grain delivery.” He also suggested using “deprivation of a part of consumer goods as a form of repression.”¹⁸ Implementing these proposals resulted in loading on the peasantry the burden of the “Black Boards.” Being entered thereon meant that automatically all goods would be removed from cooperative stores and kolkhoz trade completely forbidden. Already on

November 20, 1932, Molotov reported to Stalin by telephone that he was led to issue a “directive” that 600 Communist workers be mobilized from among activists in Ukraine’s biggest industrial centers to work on grain delivery. Other communications from Molotov to Stalin (letters, explanatory notes, and others) can be found in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History fonds.

The Molotov fond contains reports from the GPU Ukr SSR with the signature of the deputy head, Karl Karlson. In a report dated December 28, 1931, “On the Progress of Grain Delivery in Ukraine,” the systematic “under-fulfillment of the delivery plan” is explained by the right-opportunistic attitude of the village *aktiv* and raion functionaries, counter-action by “kulaks,” ineffective explanatory activities, insufficient delivery of consumer goods. Examples are given of the “free-thinking” of individual peasants: “They’re taking away our last bit of grain, all the policies of the government are intended to leave us hungry”; or, “The Soviet government has brought us to the point where we are forced to run away to distant horizons. Obviously, government policy is bringing about the destruction of the village.”¹⁹

A general picture of how the grain deliveries were proceeding in December 1931, is given in the next report covering that month. Information provided there, about grain being hidden by individual peasants and collective farmers, shows that repressive measures were implemented [by the authorities] against their own people. In only six days in December, 62 investigations were initiated against workers in the Soviet apparatus for inactivity, poor management, concealing and wasting grain.²⁰ A special report “On the Death and Mass Slaughter of Livestock” of December 28, 1931, tells of the completely unsatisfactory state of livestock in the collective farm and individual sectors and cites quantitative indicators. As an official version of the reason for the situation are proposed: poor administration, low level of veterinary services, and unfavorable state of feed supplies.

A number of telegrams from Molotov to senior officials in Ukraine (f. 82, op. 2, d. 141) testify to a mind-set prepared to intensify repressive measures for failure to fulfill the grain-delivery plan. One such telegram from M. Khataiev and V. Molotov, of November 5, 1932, sent to *obkom* secretaries of the CP(b)U demanded: “to impose to the extreme appropriate repressions, particularly now, when it is indispensable that a decisive turning point in grain deliveries be achieved at all costs.”²¹ A telegram from Molotov to Kosior concentrates on the Chernihiv region. It is suggested that Mykola Skrypnyk be sent

16. See Valerii Vasyli'iev, “Tsina holodnoho khliba,” in *Komandyry velykoho holodu*, 25.

17. See “Kil'kist' MTS ta ploshcha zoranoi zemli u kolkhospakh, iaki vony obsluhovuiut' v URSR, za danymy Traktorotsentru SRSR,” “Vydavannia zerna radhospam i kolkhospam na nasinnia ta prodovolstvo v 1932 r. za danymy Komitetu zahotivel' pry Radi pratsi ta oborony SRSR,” “Ploshcha iaroi sivby v 1930-1932 rr. za danymy Narkomzemu SRSR,” “Dani Derzhplanu SRSR pro vrozhainist' zernovykh ta tekhnichnykh kul'tur v URSR za 1928-1931 rr.,” “Dani Tsentralnoho upravlinnia narodnohospodars'koho obliku SRSR pro vrozhainist' v SRSR ta URSR,” “Dani pro valovy zbir zernovykh v SRSR ta URSR za 1927-1932 rr.,” “Dani Komitetu zahotivel' SRSR pro vykonannia planu khlibozahotivel' raionamy SRSR v 1931-1933 rr.,” in *Komandyry velykoho holodu*, 215-28.

18. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 141, l. 7.

19. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 138, l. 80-97.

20. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 138, l. 103-114.

21. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 141, l. 18.

there to apply control. In other telegrams to obkom secretaries it was stated that the Chernihiv region was bringing shame on the “successes” in grain delivery of other oblasts of Ukraine.

The Stalin fond (f. 558) along with other informative documents holds one of the most cynical documents of this period, namely, the Directive, dated January 27, 1933, of the CC VKP(b) and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars USSR on preventing the mass exodus of hungry peasants. This document forbids the entry of starving Ukrainian peasants into Russian territory and orders that “after separating counter-revolutionary elements, the rest are to be returned to their place of residence” (op. 11, d. 45, l. 109).

Part of Stalin’s archive is held in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. Here one finds additional evidence of how the Communist Party “cared” for the peasantry, particularly the Ukrainian peasantry. Especially eloquent are the materials on the progress of investigations into resistance to grain deliveries in Orikhov raion of Dnipropetrovsk oblast in Ukraine (f. 3, op. 58, d. 380), which have appeared in the publication *Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi vlasti. Ianvar’ 1922-dekabr’ 1936 g.* (Lubianka. Stalin and the VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Stalin archive. Documents of the Higher Organs of Party and State Authority. January 1922-December, 1936, Moscow 2003). Copies of the interrogation of those Party leaders accused of undermining the grain-delivery plan in 1932 and of witnesses were sent to all CC and CCC members and candidates, *obkom* and *kraikom* secretaries and members of the Narkomzem USSR Collegium with an introduction by Stalin. This “performance” with its fabricated documentation was primarily intended to exert psychological pressure, to head off possible manifestations of disobedience.

Some notes from Genrikh Yagoda to Stalin reflect the process of deportation (here called “the operation”) of families and individuals from the Kuban (f. 3, op. 30, d. 196). According to the documents, in November-December, 1932, 4,158 families were expelled to the Ural region (where their re-settlement was “looked after” by the OGPU); 1,992 families were sent to north Kazakhstan and to special settlements. In no document is the nationality of the “special re-settlers” mentioned, but the name of the stanitsa —Poltavska— that figures in many of the documents as a base of Ukrainian counter-revolution, lends credence to the conclusion that there was a notable Ukrainian component among the special re-settlers. Other documents also bear this out. The draft of an order to the OGPU on the campaign against theft of grain, dated July 5, 1933, sent to Stalin by Yagoda, anticipated a new wave of arrests, organization

of surveillance by agents, increasing control by the OGPU over “unreliable” farmsteads (among which was the Novyi Svit commune in Ukraine), review of all cases in the course of two weeks (f. 3, op. 57, d. 60). This draft led to discussion among those that were to implement it but, on September 15, 1933, the CC All-UnionCP(b) adopted a decision “On Safeguarding Grain” which broadened the OGPU’s authority to include organization of grain storage.

Letters [to Stalin] from the prominent Russian author, Mikhail Sholokhov, have a direct bearing on this matter. Sholokhov provided many instances of abuse committed against the *stanichniki* who failed to discern the advantage of the collective system: those who “disagreed” were beaten, stripped to their underwear and confined in storage sheds in January-February; kerosene was poured on women’s feet and skirts, set alight and then put out; they were buried to the waist in the ground; given pistols and forced to shoot themselves; made to sit on heated stovetops; driven barefoot through the snow; forced to drink large quantities of water mixed with pork fat, wheat, and kerosene.²² These methods of “interrogation” were applied for one reason: to find bread that did not exist, thus condemning them to death by starvation. In expectation of help from Stalin (or intending it as the final argument) in his letter of April 16, 1933, Sholokhov relates in detail the situation in the Veshensk and Verkhnodonsk regions and reports that one sees people swollen with hunger everywhere. Promising relief, Stalin hinted to Sholokhov that the latter was not apprised of many matters, emphasizing that “the honorable agriculturalists are not as vulnerable as might appear from afar.”²³ Before too long Sholokhov’s defense of the peasantry was to have a palpable effect on his own personal fate.

A great mass of documents with information on economic, socio-political, administrative matters (including the USSR’s social-economic policies regarding the countryside) is concentrated in the Russian State Archive of the Economy, reorganized in 1992 out of the Central State Archive of the National Economy of the USSR. In the 2,021 fonds in this archive there are more than four million documentary units resulting from the activities of people’s commissariats, ministries, state committees and other organizations which provided planning and financing, set standards and directed components of the national economy of the former USSR.

22. See *Pisatel’ i vozhd’. Peregiska M. A. Sholokhova s I. V. Stalinym. 1931-1950 gody. Sbornik dokumentov iz lichnogo arkhiva I. V. Stalina*, compiled by Iu. Murin (Moscow: Raritet, 1997), 49-51.

23. *Ibid.*, 69. See also *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, edited by V. Danilov, et al.

The fond pertaining to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR (f. 413) contains documents for 1917-1988, among which, given the focus of this paper, the “Materials on the Export Activities of the Narkomzovneshtorg [People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade]” covering 1932-1933 are particularly of interest. Gathered here are statistical data on the export of different groups of goods (primarily of agricultural provenance) which are an important source for general statements and conclusions on the extent to which the peasantry was deliberately deprived of the product of its labor. An explanatory note to the accounts report of the All-Union Society Eksportkhliv for 1932 (op. 13, d. 28) includes the basic indicators of its activity, among them those of its representatives in Ukraine. The files “References and Summaries of the Economic-Planning Administration on the Fulfillment of the Plan on Deliveries of Goods for Export in the Republics, Oblasts, Krai of the USSR and of Narkomzovneshtorg Organizations in 1933” (op. 13, spr. 595) and also “Reports of All-Union Societies Rybkonserveksport, Lektexshyrovyna, Mineralsylykateksport, and Plodeksport on fulfillment of exports and income in the Fourth Quarter of 1933” (op. 12, d. 18401) deal with delivery of goods for export, particularly in Ukraine. This last document emphasizes that “as a result of the campaign to achieve the export plan in the Ukr SSR” a situation was reached by which “Party and Soviet organs through their directives obligated trade organizations to devote more attention to exports.”²⁴ The direct and primary victim of this campaign was the Ukrainian peasantry. In the fond are also a number of documents relating to the confiscation of gold, silver, and diamonds from the populace.

The documents of the All-Union Society for Trade with Foreigners “Torgsin” (f. 4333), which existed from 1931 to 1936, reflect the process of fulfilling the currency plan—the “mobilization” of so-called ritual-lifestyle gold (rings, pectoral crosses, earrings, family valuables, gold coins of old minting) for the building of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station (Dniprohes), the Kharkiv, Stalingrad, and Cheliabinsk tractor plants, the Magnitobud, and other giants of Soviet economy. As the noted Ukrainian scholar, Vasyly’ Marochko, has shown, in 1933 the All-Ukrainian Torgsin Office, located in Kharkiv, collected over 24,000,000 “old-value” rubles.²⁵ At this same time more than 5,000,000 Ukrainian peasants starved to death. Research into documents with information on Torgsin’s activities is important as analysis of the state’s repressive policies towards those who were feeding it.

Instructions on depriving the population of the means of existence are found in the fond of the People’s

Commissariat of Supply of the USSR (f. 8043) for 1930-1934. The document “Information Regarding the Progress of the Grain-Delivery Campaign of 1930-1931, Based on Materials from Local OGPU Organs” (op. 11, d. 13) illustrates the nature of this activity in the Ukrainian SSR. It describes the punitive and enforcement measures used for its “improvement” and shows the fashion in which grain deliveries were conducted on the eve of the Great Famine. The cynicism of those executing this work is highlighted by an amendment by Anastas Mikoian to a proposal of the CC CPU regarding changes in a CC VKP decision to forbid the seizing of an only cow. “We should seize even an only cow if the contract calls for it.”²⁶ On the other hand, a report “On the Progress of Grain Deliveries” of September 21, 1930, speaks of “unpreparedness” to implement “organizational measures” and “mobilization of the masses around grain deliveries” and the “resistance of the kulak element.”²⁷ In the minutes of the “Grain Consultation” that took place December 3, 1931, an enjoinder regarding increasing delivery of bulk fodder and a stress on the obligation that annual plans be met by the set deadline stands out.²⁸ A decision reached by the Collegium of the Narkomat for Grain and Livestock Sovkhozoes of the USSR, July 14, 1933, calls for an increase in the grain-delivery plans of grain sovkhozoes in Ukraine by 7,500,000 poods bringing the plan for all sovkhozoes to 20,700,000 poods.²⁹

The fond of the People’s Commissariat of Finance of the USSR (f. 7733) has circulars from Narkomfin to union republics which state that it is imperative to use “decisive” measures to collect the agricultural tax from the kulaks, to take the indebted to court, to submit reports immediately on the results of this tax-gathering and how many had been brought before the law. It is indicated here that Ukraine is the most “owing,” having met the agricultural tax plan by only 55 percent as of March 1931.³⁰ “The matter of identifying kulak farmsteads in the Ukr[ainian] SSR is especially disgraceful,” according to the circular for September 5, 1931. This accusation is bolstered by quantitative indicators: in 1930, 22,095 kulaks were subject to taxes, but 6,456 in 1931.³¹

Similar information is recorded in the archival fond of the Ministry of Grain Products of the USSR (f. 8040). Particularly telling is a circular from the Committee for Deliveries of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regarding implementing repressive measures against those “not fulfilling the law on grain delivery.” Instead, A. Grinevich, Deputy People’s Commissar for Agriculture sent a report, dated May 3, 1932, to Ia.

26. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 15, l. 78.

27. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 17, l. 111-12.

28. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 46, l. 78.

29. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 6, d. 26, l. 152-56.

30. RGAE, f. 7733, op. 8, d. 192, l. 93-95.

31. *Ibid.*, l. 41-44.

24. See RGAE, f. 413, op. 12, d. 18401, l. 183.

25. V. Marochko, “Rosiiis’ki arkhivni dzherela,” 48.

Iakovlev, People's Commissar for Agriculture (f. 7486 "Narkomat zemlerobstva SRSR") reporting famine in Zinoviiv raion of Odesa oblast. Here peasants were getting "on average" 76 kgs bread per each family member for the whole year." He proposed that assistance be provided in foodstuffs for people and for livestock, and also to send tractors and trucks.³² A decision, dated September 2, 1932, of the Committee for Delivery of Agricultural Products recorded a reduction in the annual grain-delivery plan for Ukraine by 40,000,000 poods.³³

Data about the forced re-settlement in November–December, 1933, of 21,000 collective farmers from Belarus and Russia to Ukrainian villages whose inhabitants had died of hunger, and the settling of Kuban stanitsas whose Ukrainian population had succumbed to famine by de-mobilized Red Army soldiers, are kept in the fond of the All-Union Re-Settlement Committee at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (f. 5675). The archival information held there reflects the activities of the basic initiators of the re-settlement—Molotov and Kaganovich. It includes the geography of transport movements with re-settlers into Ukraine, the places of their distribution (Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovs'k oblasts) and the reasons for efforts by Belarusian and Russian peasants to return home.

Statistical data about the number of victims of famine and those that died during epidemics (of typhus, diphtheria, scarlet fever) caused by the deterioration in sanitary-epidemic conditions in Ukraine in the middle 1930s are found in materials from the 1937 census (f. 1562). Information provided by this archive shows that in 1932–1933 the rate of mortality was higher than the birth rate. Moreover, it showed that the geographical center of mortality was in Ukraine which in that period accounted for half of all deaths in the USSR.

In the State Archive of the Russian Federation, formed in 1992, are concentrated fonds of the USSR's higher organs of power and of state administration from 1917 (other than those now in specialized state archives of the federal level, and in departmental archives). In these holdings are found documents directly bearing on the Holodomor. Among the 26,510 files for the period 1917-1940 of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR fond (f. 3316), particularly important are the minutes and decisions of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR stemming from reviews of representations by the OGPU and the NKVD regarding extension of the term of confinement under guard and confiscation of property for 1930–1934; citizens' petitions to the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR against unlawful acts by persons in authority; documents

pertaining to consultations and commissions of the Central Executive Committee. Documents from the fond of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (f. 5446), with its 238,025 cases, are of similar content. Particularly important are the minutes of meetings and the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR; minutes of the broadened sessions of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the USSR Labor and Defense Council, decisions of the USSR Council of People's Commissars; correspondence related to the sowing campaign (1931); documents of the Secret Section for Management of Affairs of the USSR Council of People's Commissars on the struggle with the kulaks, special re-settlers, etc.

Reports, papers, tables of indicators from inter-raion commissions and authorized officials of the State Commission on the Progress of the Grain Harvest, aggregate tables on the dimensions and dynamics of areas under seed and the gross harvest of grain, instructions for harvest calculations, samples of forms and other documents are gathered in the fond of the Central State Commission for Determining the Productivity of the Harvest and Size of the Gross Harvest of Grains of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (f. 7589, 567 files, 1932-1937). The Commission was formed in December 1932, to determine the area for seeding, the harvest and gross yield of grains and sunflower by raions, oblasts, republics, and the USSR as a whole. Documents generated by this Commission's activities contain information valuable for comparative analysis.

The fond of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (f. 9401) holds documents of the NKVD USSR from the 1930s. Several series of documents deserve attention: correspondence with People's Commissariats, with republican and local organs of the NKVD on specific sensitive matters; orders; instructions; NKVD circulars, documents pertaining to operations ("special files") of the NKVD Secretariat. This archive also holds documents reflecting the forced re-settlement of Ukrainians and special papers on the deportation of social and ethno-national population groups, mostly from the second half of the 1930s. In the course of 1930–1931, 63,720 families were deported from Ukraine (19,658 to Northern Russia; 32,127 to the Ural region; 323 to Western and Eastern Siberia. From the Kuban were deported 38,404 families, of these in particular, 25,995 to the Ural region. In connection with this, of importance are documents from the fond of the Main Administration of Places of Imprisonment MVD USSR (f. 9414, 7615 files); and, particularly, materials of the Main Administration of Camps of the USSR Council of People's Commissars for 1930-1934.

The Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation holds specific documents that

32. RGAE, f. 558, op. 11, d. 43, l. 60.

33. RGAE, f. 8040, op. 8, d. 1, l. 111.

reflect the situation in the famine-stricken regions, for example, reports in detail, special records of the Secret-Political Section of the OGPU about the expulsion of kulaks in 1931, and on the progress of collectivization for 1931-1932. These are arranged according to a geographic principle (Ukraine, Belarus, Western oblast, the Central Chornozem area, Moscow oblast, Nizhegorod krai, Central Volga krai, the Ivanov industrial oblast, and others). Almost all these documents have information about Ukraine. The special function of these documents and their limited distribution (as a rule they are classified "Secret" or "Top Secret") explain why here the word "famine" is widely used. This word was generally avoided in Party documents (at least in 1931-1932), despite the fact that they, too, were classified.

According to a report, dated June 12, 1931, of the Special Section OGPU, "On the Progress in Expelling Kulaks," 3,089 families and 11,527 individuals are to be transported to Ural oblast. Boarding of seven trains has been completed, four have been "unloaded," 55 trainloads remain to be transported to their destination.³⁴ An explanatory note to these figures, behind which lie thousands of maimed human fates, indicates that most of the transports, while en route, were without food. The numbers of those who died and of those who were shot while trying to escape are given. In addition, the "tendency to escape while en route" is recognized as being endemic to Ukrainian kulaks.³⁵ Another special report, "On the Progress of Expulsion of Kulak Families and Anti-Soviet Manifestations in Connection with the Expulsion," dated July 17, 1931, cites the "negative" reaction on the part of the population: organization of armed resistance; flight; the suicides of entire families. A special report "On the Progress of Expulsion from Nizhno-Volga krai, Ukraine, and the North-Caucasus krai of the Kulak and Counter-Revolutionary Element that Hampers Grain Deliveries," of January 14, 1933, tells of expulsions from Odesa oblast to the Northern krai of 2,172 persons; from Chernihiv oblast of 1,320, and 4,037 from Dnipropetrovs'k oblast.³⁶

Another special report "On the Progress of Collectivization and the Mass Action of the Peasantry in 1931 to January-March, 1932" attributes the famine in the Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Vinnytsia oblasts to "foodstuff problems," cites 83 instances of swelling due to hunger, six deaths, consumption of carrion in twelve families, four cases of abandonment of children.³⁷ These numbers, so obviously improbable, testify to how official reports minimized and distorted the true extent of the tragedy. Notice is also taken of

the unsatisfactory condition of draught resources, of emigrational tendencies in border regions, a drastic increase in the number of mass protests (253 in half a year). To safeguard grain deliveries, the GPU arrested 836 persons on suspicion of participating in terrorist activities, and 327 for having committed terrorist acts. An addendum to a special report about the anti-kolkhoz movement and famine in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and individual regions of the USSR testifies eloquently to the condition of the Ukrainian village in the first half of 1932. Against the background of information about cases of swelling and death through starvation, the report speaks of cannibalism and suicide brought on by hunger. "In terms of mass anti-Soviet occurrences, Ukraine stands in first place" (in the period January 1 to July 13, 1932, the GPU "registered" 923 overt instances of opposition).³⁸ By identifying Ukraine, the hungry populace of which was supposedly preparing for an armed uprising, as the epicenter of a threat to the regime, Soviet functionaries were free to intensify the terror.

Other subjects are also common to these special reports by the GPU (for example, the refusal of individual farms to sow). According to the GPU's figures, in 1932, 19,198 peasants in Kyiv oblast refused to sow; 13,090 in Dnipropetrovs'k and 8,180 in Vinnytsia oblasts refused as well.³⁹ Also found is the text of Yagoda's report, made by direct wire, about the destruction of a Ukrainian counter-revolutionary organization in the Poltavaska stanitsa in the Kuban and repressive measures by the GPU against the people of the stanitsa.⁴⁰

A report from Yagoda to Stalin and Molotov, dated February 2, 1933, about the struggle against mass flight from the Ukr SSR, the North Caucasus krai, and the BSSR (f. 3, op. 30, d. 189) states that the transport sections of the OGPU have created screening and operational search groups. In the period January 22-30, 18,379 Ukrainians were detained, most of whom were sent back, the remainder arrested. Another report states that on February 11-13, 2,377 persons were detained; 2,354 were turned back, and 23 arrested (f. 3, op.30, d. 189).

Apart from the archives already mentioned, documents related to the problem of the Holodomor are also to be found in other archives of the federal and regional level. Thus in the fonds of the Russian State Archive of Literature and Culture, which holds documents on the history of literature, social thought, music, theater, film, and painting, may be found information about the state of literature at that time, the honoraria paid to authors for "commissioned" works, and also diaries and inter-personal communication. Of particular interest for

34. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 539, l. 29-33.

35. Ibid.

36. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1310, l. 28-29.

37. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 10, d. 53, l. 1-64.

38. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1449, l. 106-18.

39. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1449, l. 144-46.

40. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 896, l. 77-78.

researchers is Oleksander Dovzhenko's archive, which, however, is sealed until 2020.

Some fonds held in the Russian State Military Archive relate indirectly to the famine in Ukraine. There is, for example, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, "On the Organization of Red Army Kolkhozes," of May 17, 1931, classified "Secret." Other documents also deal with the same subject.

Documents bearing on the Holodomor in Ukraine are also found in regional archives. The State Archive of Sverdlovsk Oblast has information on the forced mobilization of peasants for work on the building of the giant projects of Stalin's Five-Year Plans: Magnitostroi, Uralugol, Uralstroindustriia, Permtransles, Uralmashstroi, Khimstroi, and others. The 500,000 special re-settlers in early February 1932 included Ukrainians as well (primarily from the Kuban). To survive they had to fulfill the norm: production of 2–2.5 cubic meters of wood per day. For this the laborer received bread containing 90 percent sawdust. Failure to achieve the quota meant reduction of food to 75 percent, or to have it denied altogether.

The Documentation Center of the Recent History of Voronezh Oblast holds a notable quantity of documents about famine in regions that are today within the Russian Federation.

In the holdings of the Documentation Center of the Recent History of Krasnodar Krai documents for the period 1937-1991 are represented quite satisfactorily, but there are very evident gaps for the early 1930s and the period 1941-1945. Among the Center's documents declassified after 1991 are minutes and stenographic reports of Party conferences and plenums dealing with the introduction of collectivization, de-kulakization, expulsion of the inhabitants of Kuban stanitsas (f. 1, Kubano-Chernomorskii obkom).

It is impossible to describe in detail the composition and contents of the archival fonds mentioned here within the limits of this brief summary. Such an undertaking would require a systematic and focused examination that would culminate in a specialized annotated reference work. In passing one might mention the need to create an all-encompassing guide to the composition and contents of all archival fonds that contain information about the Holodomor. This guide should provide information on the archives in various countries and, given the wide geographic bounds this implies and the vastness of the information held, would require the efforts of not just one researcher, but the combined efforts of a group of scholars dedicated to this very purpose.

The need for a thematic reference work and archival guide stems from the state of public thinking about recognizing the Holodomor as genocide and also by the presence in Ukrainian and foreign historiography

of contrary interpretations of the historic sources used for the study of this problem. The parliaments of ten countries (the U.S., Canada, Estonia, Argentina, Australia, Hungary, Latvia, Georgia, and Poland) have recognized the Holodomor of 1932–1933 as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people; the Ukrainian parliament also has officially recognized the Holodomor as genocide with the passing in November 2006 of the law "On the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine." This official recognition, however, has not solved the problem of the politicization of the issue and conflicting approaches to interpreting the information now available.

It is difficult not to agree with the conclusion reached by the Ukrainian scholar Vasyl' Marochko about the presence in the historiography of the Holodomor of a "conceptual diversity of thought and interpretation."⁴¹ While there are no particular differences in assessing collectivization, de-kulakization, the grain-delivery campaigns, and the deportation and repressions of the peasantry as the basic *economic* factors underlying the Famine, the positions of scholars regarding the *political* factors vary greatly. They range from seeing the Holodomor as the deliberate and intentional destruction of Ukrainians by the Communist regime to attenuating the Ukrainian tragedy, "diluting" it, by spreading it thinly among other republics.

A recent statement of the Russian view on the problem of the Holodomor in Ukraine can be found in an article by Andrei Marchukov, a candidate of historical sciences. Marchukov tellingly titles his article "Operation 'Holodomor.'" Seeking to show that the "Holodomor is an ideological conception, a powerful instrument for acting on the mass consciousness,"⁴² the author concludes that "there are no serious arguments to support the concept of 'Holodomor.'"⁴³

This statement alone testifies to the urgent need to create a reference guide to the archives, so that researchers are in a position to consult the primary sources as they seek the truth about the Holodomor.

Iryna Matiash, doctor of historical sciences (2001) and professor (2003), is the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Archival Affairs and Document Studies in Kyiv. She is a leading authority on the history of archives in Ukraine.

41. V. I. Marochko, "Suchasna zarubizhna istoriohrafia holodu 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraini: Nova chy stara interpretatsiia?" *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 3 (2006): 195.

42. A. Maruchkov, "Operatsiia 'golodomor,'" *Rodina*, 1 (2007): 60.

43. *Ibid.*, 66